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From a series of qualitative interviews with Japanese managers and German managers and 
workers in thirty-one Japanese-owned companies in the Dusseldorf region of western Germany, 
this article discusses differences in cultural patterns and organizational styles between the 
German and Japanese employees and the problems these pose for communication, cooperation, 
and morale. First, we deal with cultural contrasts: language issues, interpersonal styles 
(personability and politeness), and norms regarding the taking of responsibility. Second, we 
examine the impact on cross-nationality relations of established organizational practice: for 
example, German specialism vs. Japanese generalism; direct and vertical vs. indirect and 
incremental decision making. We also discuss efforts by these firms to find compromise systems 
that would meet the needs and interests of both sides. The third focus is the reactions of Japanese 
companies in North Rhine-Westphalia to German unions, works councils, and codetermination 
regulations. In the labor view, Japanese firms overall do no better or worse than comparable 
German firms. 
 
 Japanese direct investment in Western economies is concentrated in North America and 
the United Kingdom. In consequence, a rich journalistic and scholarly literature examines the 
Japanese experience in the Anglo-American countries, the management styles and organization 
structures of the subsidiaries, and the relations between the Japanese management and the local 
workforce (see, e.g., Milkman, 1991; Lincoln, Olson, and Hanada, 1978; Pucik, Hanada, and 
Fifield, 1989; Florida and Kenney, 1992; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1990). There is far less writing, 
particularly in English, on the activities of Japanese companies elsewhere in the West. Yet the 
Japanese corporate presence in continental Europe is already substantial and will almost certainly 
grow as the European Union and the GAlT erode regulatory and other national barriers to foreign 
investment and trade. 
 The topic of this paper is Japanese firms in Germany: primarily, the contrasts in culture 
and management style that German and Japanese employees of such firms encounter daily in 
their experiences on the job. Our observations come from a set of interviews conducted in 1992-
93 with Japanese and German managers in the Diisseldorf area, the region of Germany with the 
highest concentration of Japanese business, and, after London, the leading center of Japanese 
corporate activity in Europe. Moreover, while our Diisseldorf informants no doubt have their 
biases, they expressed confidence that, owing to its central location in continental Western 
Europe and easy access to the East, Dusseldorf would someday overtake London as the premier 
locus of Japanese business activity in Europe. 
 Moreover, Germany-North Rhine-Westphalia, in particular-presents a valuable 
opportunity for research on such questions because of its substantial Japanese business activity. 
In 1990, Japan, at 5 billion DM, was second only to the United States and the Netherlands in 
direct investment in the region, this accounting for half the total Japanese investment. Germany 
was second only to the United Kingdom in the number of resident Japanese in Europe. Forty-five 
percent of the German-resident Japanese population lives in North Rhine-Westphalia, with 
almost 8,000 in Diisseldorf alone. A 1991 survey by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in 
Diisseldorf found 75,000 Germans employed by 1,099 Japanese corporations in Germany, with 
more than 100 billion DM in profits in Germany. As a set, then, Japanese corporations have the 
same weight in the German economy as does Daimler-Benz. 
 Our information on Japanese-owned companies in Germany comes from a series of 
qualitative interviews with Japanese managers, German managers, works council members, and 
labor leaders in the Dusseldorf area. We surveyed thirty-one Japanese-owned firms in a diverse 
mix of industries. The interviews were open-ended: we posed a series of broad questions 
regarding the management and industrial relations and how they were viewed by both German 
and Japanese employees (see Kerbo, Wittenhagen, and Nakao, 1994a, 1994b). Additional 
interviews were conducted with all works council members in six of the companies. In all such 
interviews, we solicited impressions and details on the relations between Japanese  company 
officials and their German employees. We asked the Germans to contrast their Japanese 
employer with German companies they had worked for in the past. In a number of firms, the 
Japanese managers we interviewed had experience in the United States and elsewhere in Europe. 
Finally, we interviewed labor union officials regarding union and works council activities among 
the Japanese companies of Dusseldorf. 
 The list of corporations from which we selected was provided by the Japanische 
Industrie-und Handelskammer zu Diisseldorf, which identified all the Japanese corporations 
and their top management personnel for the year 1992. The thirty-one companies included three 
financial services firms, seven large trading companies, one engineering firm, two heavy 
manufacturing firms doing marketing research in Germany, and eighteen other manufacturing 
corporations. Of the eighteen manufacturers, only seven had production facilities in Germany, 
the activities of the remainder being limited to sales, service, and R & D. We attempted in every 
organization to interview the highest level Japanese and German managers, either together or 
separately. However, in a relatively small number of firms, our contacts were exclusively from 
one group or the other. The works council interviews were conducted exclusively with Germans 
and with no managers of either nationality present. 
 The article is broadly exploratory and somewhat normative in tone, not hypothesis testing 
in the conventional sense. Our concerns are with how sociocultural differences combine with 
organizational styles to complicate the working relationships between Japanese and German 
employees. Some contrasts in how the Japanese and Germans approach organizational life are 
deep-rooted in societal values and customs; others reflect the institutionalized practices of the 
Japanese or German firm. Both complicate cross-nationality relations in the workplace but the 
institutional contrasts are, in a sense, less fundamental and more amenable to adjustments that 
allow for common ground. 
 German economic organization, corporate structure, and management practice bear 
strong resemblance to patterns in Japan. Yet in other respects, the Germans and the Japanese 
seem poles apart. How these similarities and differences shape the relations between German and 
Japanese employees within the Japanese-owned company and, consequently, its success and 
viability are the subject of our inquiry. 
 
Social and Cultural Barriers 
 
The Japanese of Diisseldorf The Diisseldorf community of Japanese residents is the oldest in 
Europe. Its origins trace to the business ties which Japanese steel and trading companies forged 
with German heavy industry in the Ruhr region. The tight-knit Japanese Dusseldorf enclave, like 
that of Scarsdale, New York, and other Western residential concentrations of Japanese expatriate 
families, provides all the services, facilities, and social supports that Japanese managers and their 
families require to maintain a Japanese life-style during a German tour of duty. Stores and 
restaurants offer Japanese foodstuffs, clothing, and home furnishings; enclave schools enable 
expatriate children to pursue a Japanese education undisrupted by an overseas stay; cultural 
activities (music, art, classes in flower arranging, tea ceremony) preserve Japanese cultural 
ambience and provide outlets for the interests of Japanese managers’ wives; clubs, associations, 
and neighbors offer a supportive network of acquaintances and friends.  
 This self-contained expatriate society offers real benefits to the rotating Japanese 
managers in the North Rhine subsidiaries of Japanese firms. It permits assignment to the region 
with less shock to family life than the typical Japanese corporate transfer occasions. Yet the 
negatives are prominent as well. Insulated from real exposure to German society beyond their 
encounters in the firm, the average expatriate Japanese learns far less from his German tour of 
duty than he otherwise might, even though the benefits of a globalizing experience were 
probably a factor in the parent company’s decision to dispatch him abroad in the first place.1 
Moreover, the size and isolation of the Dusseldorf enclave feed suspicions on the German side 
that the Japanese are by nature clannish and reclusive. By the same token and combined with the 
recent epidemic of antiforeigner sentiment in Germany, the lack of real exposure to German 
society and culture exacerbates Japanese anxieties over German racial prejudice, although the 
Diisseldorf Japanese have by and large escaped harassment by German right-wing groups. 
The problem of English. Peculiar as it may seem that English is the language of the workplace 
among Japanese firms in Germany, the reasons are clear: (1) the same firms are involved in other  
 
1. Indeed, one of the criticisms often leveled at the Japanese practice of rotating expatriate staff through the 
foreign subsidiary is that, by exposing a large number of career managers to a relatively brief 
international experience, the overseas assignment benefits the honsha (parent) much more than the 
subsidiary. 
 
European countries and North America as well; (2) all university-educated Japanese have 
substantial English training albeit highly uneven practical proficiency; and (3) most German-
based Japanese corporations have employees who are neither Japanese nor German. Indeed, 
several of our companies had citizens from more than a dozen nations working in Dusseldorf. 
 
 A sizable literature on Japanese firms in the Anglo-American economies comments on 
the communication obstacles and sometime tensions between the local hires and the Japanese 
expatriate team. Language figures importantly in the problem: the English spoken by the 
Japanese is often mediocre at best, and with rare exceptions the Western staff speak no Japanese 
at all. Such problems are aggravated in Germany and elsewhere in continental Europe by the fact 
that English is the native language of neither the local nor the expatriate staff. As one manager 
observed, “You think you have grasped what the other party was saying but often you have not.” 
Still, the Germans hold the linguistic edge: many enjoyed a relaxed facility with English that few 
Japanese shared (Lorenz, 1994b). Part of the reserve shown by the Japanese staff about which 
our German informants repeatedly complained seems traceable to this. To attempt awkward 
English ’and struggle with verbalizing one’s thoughts before a group of German and Japanese 
subordinates is humiliating to a proud Japanese manager: far less risky to sit in stony silence or 
confine conversation to other Japanese. 
 Despite the obvious problems of communication posed by the language barrier, it is only 
the tip of the iceberg. German-Japanese contrasts in societal as well as organizational culture 
likewise present troublesome if interesting obstacles to information flow and understanding. 
Such obstacles are more severe in Germany than in the Anglo-American countries simply 
because Japanese investments there are narrower in scope and more recent in time. Moreover, 
German-language journalistic and scholarly commentary on Japan and Japanese business is to 
date far less rich than the extant English-language literature. 
 
Politeness as a cultural norm. An amusing but still consequential contrast in German and 
Japanese cultural patterns turns on the issue of politeness. The Japanese are famous for taking 
politeness to extremes: the ritual gestures of deference and humility (bowing); the verb endings 
and forms of address that vary with the status of the parties and the formality of the occasion; the 
frequent insertion in normal speech of apologetic expressions (e.g., surnimasen).2 Moreover, a 
distinct offshoot of the Japanese politeness syndrome that time and again confuses gaijin 
(foreigners) is a reluctance to say no with clarity, finality, and firmness. The title of Akio Morita 
and Shintaro Ishihara’s (1989) provocative book, NO to ieru Nihon (The Japan that Can Say 
NO), addresses this tendency. Ironically, the Japanese avoidance of refusal is tied to behavior 
that Westerners find disingenuous if not downright rude: a propensity to ignore rather than 
acknowledge queries or requests to which the Japanese party prefers not to accede. This sort of 
communication problem is widely attributed to the vagueness of the Japanese language and to a 
Japanese disdain for blunt, contractual commitments. 3 But its roots also lie with the Japanese 
aversion to conflict, particularly of a confrontational, face-to-face sort.4 
 Germans, in marked contrast, suffer a reputation for being curt, blunt, arrogant, if not, at 
times, flat-out rude.5 Germans with whom we spoke acknowledged a shortage of civility within 
their ranks, particularly evident in the aloof at best, at worst irritable and surly demeanor of retail 
clerks, service workers, and petty bureaucrats. “Service with a scowl,” as the Wall Street  
 
2. The ultimate in polite forms is keigo, a flowery style in which fewer and fewer young Japanese are 
competent. Recently companies have taken it on themselves to school their employees in this form, since it 
still finds occasional use in formal business rituals. 
  
Journal recently labeled it (Nelson, 1994), does at times appear to be the German norm. Of  
course, some of the rough treatment meted out by lower-level German service workers no doubt 
stems from a social democratic aversion to the sort of groveling by service people that is still rife 
in Japan. 
 Yet there is a common thread in German brusqueness and Japanese politeness: distaste 
for easy informality early in a relationship. Germans and Japanese are similarly averse to the use 
of given names with all but intimates, and both are critical of Americans for their glib 
informality and superficial friendliness. 
 Both cultures, moreover, value deep and lasting relationships in business and politics but 
are resistant to forming them with outsiders. The Japanese have a reputation for being hard to get 
to know.6 Reasons abound: the scarcity of leisure time; the separation of men’s and women’s 
lives; the inadequacy of Japanese homes for entertaining; the separation a collectivist society 
imposes on in- and out-group members. The standoffishness of the Japanese was troubling to the 
Germans in our study. They saw it as a barrier to genial workplace relations and strong 
identification with the Japanese-owned firm. German managers claimed repeated efforts to 
socialize with the Japanese staff there were invitations to dinner, sports exhibitions, and other  
3. Indeed, the need for greater transparency (romei) in Japanese business and diplomatic relationships 
is much discussed in Japan these days (Ozawa, 1994). Part of the reason for former Prime Minister 
Morihiro Hosokawa’s extraordinary popularity as a reformist politician was his plain speech that broke 
with Japanese tradition and set him apart from run of the mill Japanese politicians. 
4. Contrast, for example, the mumbled, tedious, and ritualistic televised speeches and debates of the 
Japanese Diet with the sardonic eloquence and sharp personal attacks that are routine fare at the 
British House of Commons. 
5. Some claim variations by region or land. A colleague from North Rhine-Westphalia suggested that 
Hessians (residents of the German state of Hessen) were much more brusque and blunt than was 
typical of her area. 
6. Perhaps in particular the resident gaijin community in Japan whose complaints on this score daily 
fill the letters-to-the-editor page of The Japan Times. 
events. Yet the same distant attitude prevailed in the office the following day.7 Even during after-
hours drinking outings the barriers remained. One German manager observed that there would be 
“Japanese” business from which the Germans were excluded and “other” business in which they 
might get involved. 
 Long-term Japanese residents, however, claimed that in their experience it was the 
Germans who were unfriendly and reclusive. Certainly the Japanese were every bit as bothered 
by German brusqueness as were the Germans by Japanese aloofness. There were numerous 
statements to the effect that: “Germans are too argumentative”; “Germans are too blunt”; and 
“Germans will not accept blame for problems.” One Japanese manager did, however, opine that, 
while these differences in presentation of self made communication awkward and stressful, 
cross-nationality conflict was not the outcome of note. “Oh no,” he said in response to our 
question, “almost all the conflict is among the Germans themselves; they are often so rude to 
each other.” 
 The peculiar Japanese charge that “Germans will not accept blame” warrants special 
comment. Ritual atonement is an institutionalized conflict resolution device in Japanese society. 
The Japanese expect and admire the forthright assumption of guilt, prompt and public mea 
culpas, and profuse apology even in situations where Westerners find it unnecessary or 
inappropriate. A key role obligation of higher-level managers in the Japanese firm is the 
reflexive acceptance of symbolic responsibility for the failures of their divisions or the errors of 
subordinates whether the manager’s own actions were in any way implicated or not (Wall Street 
Journal, 4 April 1989). It is in contrast rather European (ergo North American) to be direct, 
forceful, and “principled.”8 The characteristically Western impulse to defend oneself and shift 
the blame to others or cir cumstances strikes the Japanese as an egregious abdication of 
management respnsibility.9 
Does the politeness mask arrogance? In the late 1980s, a sticking point in cross-cultural 
relations in the North American Japanese subsidiary was the apparent arrogance of the Japanese 
management team. Convinced of the supremacy of Japanese methods and the caliber of Japanese 
personnel, they often bore a superior-to-thou air (Pucik, Hanada, and Fifield, 1989). Such 
snobbery fueled the reluctance of Japanese rotating managers to share responsibility with local 
staff and involve them in decisions. Asked whether condescension of this sort distinguished the 
way in which Japanese managers in Dusseldorf viewed their German compatriots, one German 
informant commented that “he hadn’t seen much of that recently.” The burst of the “bubble” 
economy, he said, had demolished the myth of Japanese invincibility. More generally, the 
postwar strength of the German economy, the quality of German goods, and the skills and 
diligence of German labor command a degree of respect from the Japanese that the United 
States, Canada, and Britain in recent years have not. Japanese management gives American 
executives high marks for commitment, effort, and intelligence. A number of our Japanese 
informants had logged time in the United States, and, in their view, German and American peak 
management teams differ little in these respects. But farther down the organization-at labor,  
7. This view may, however, reflect a misunderstanding of the function of after-hours social events in 
Japanese corporate culture. Rather than a mechanism for fostering warm feelings among workmates 
the next day, their value is that they provide a limited venue for relaxed, uninhibited conversation and 
joking until the inevitable return to the heavy decorum of the daytime Japanese workplace. 
8.  The American icon of a rugged individualist standing tall for his or her beliefs in the face of 
daunting pressures to conform wins few Japanese admirers. Contrast item #5 in the business philosophy 
of Konsuke Matsushita, the founder and corporate hero of that strongest of strong culture 
Japanese companies, Matsutshita Electric: “Meet what others expect of you! You should discern who 
expects what of us and try to meet his expectations. Never cling stubbornly to your stand only!” 
(Pascale and Athos, 1981). 
9. Of course, in Japanese society the personal risk associated with acceptance of blame is lower than 
in the United States or Europe where punitive action by the corporation or even civil and criminal 
litigation may be the response to an expansive gesture of this kind. By the same token, failure by a 
Japanese manager to take symbolic responsibility is met with strong opprobrium from the tight-knit 
business community. 
clerical, and lower management levels-the Germans were held in greater esteem. 
 For historical and cultural reasons, there may also be a latent empathy between the 
Germans and the Japanese. Both countries were on the losing side of World War II and, with 
massive U.S. assistance, staged miraculous postwar recoveries. Arguably common to both 
cultures, moreover, is respect for authority and orderliness and a sometime sense of racial/ethnic 
superiority. Finally, in the post-Cold War era, there may be among some Japanese and Germans 
a sentiment that, as the world’s second and third largest market economies, their countries should 
ally in offsetting the economic and diplomatic/military hegemony of the United States. This, one 
manager reported, was the view of his company’s Japanese president, a World War I1 veteran 
and avid student of German law and language. 
Cosmopolitanism at the top: Are Germans better global managers? If arrogance on the part of 
Japanese managers was less a problem in the North Rhine area than it has recently seemed in 
North America, that of the local hires-German managers and professionals-may be more so. The 
German director of personnel in the subsidiary of a major Japanese trading company (sogo 
shosha) commented that Japanese top management in the German branches of Japanese firms 
had done previous overseas tours, spoke fluent English, and were truly global managers. But the 
second-line Japanese generally had little or no foreign experience, and their facility with English 
and general sophistication in things Western were low. Yet their expatriate assignments placed 
them above the more experienced and worldly Germans. This caused the latter, he said, to 
become haughty and difficult, for they felt superior to the Japanese and resented their lower  
standing in the organization. With their multilingual skills and rich backgrounds from working 
and living in diverse countries, senior German and other continental European managers pride 
themselves on a cosmopolitanism not shared by the provincial Japanese (or North Americans and 
British for that matter; see Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Lorenz, 1994b). Another German 
manager in our study agreed that European executives do have better global management skills 
than do their counterparts elsewhere, something the Japanese sensed, he said, and found 
intimidating. 
 
Organization and Management Style 
 
 The autonomy of the German branch. Branches of Japanese companies operating in 
Germany have less autonomy than in North America. Most are unincorporated under German 
law and have yet to acquire experience in the country sufficient to warrant parent-firm 
confidence in the local management team. Moreover, German branches of Japanese companies 
are typically distributors and offices-not large-scale manufacturing works-hence their activities 
bind them closely to the Japanese parent (Japan External Trade Organization, 1993).10 This is a 
sensitive issue, for the Japanese are often criticized for heavy-handed control of foreign 
operations from offices in Tokyo or Osaka. The general manager of the subsidiary of a major 
Tokyo-headquartered electronics firm in Diisseldorf, acknowledging the limits on the freedom of 
his office to make its own decisions, went on defensively and rather at odds with the 
conventional wisdom to claim that IBM Japan was every bit as tethered to IBM’s Armonk, New 
York, offices (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). So it was unfair, he felt, to single out the Japanese for 
criticism on this score. 
 Given the Japanese reluctance to make flat refusals, there is also some likelihood that 
Japanese managers will evoke the excuse of “needing to hear from the head office” in order to  
10. Over 60 percent of the more than 1,000 Japanese companies in Germany are involved in sales and 
service: only 10 percent do any manufacturing.  
put off a decision in hopes that the problem will go away or that the local staff will tire of 
pressing the issue. How much autonomy the Japanese overseas subsidiary enjoys is, of course, 
tied to the issue of local employee access to higher management positions and decision-making 
circles. The Dusseldorf office of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) indicated that 
Germans have important postings in Japanese companies, perhaps more so than elsewhere in the 
Western world, because of the high esteem in which the Japanese hold the skill and dedication of 
German managers and the competitiveness of the German economy as a whole. However, a 1992 
publication by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Dusseldorf reports only one company 
with a German in the top executive position of the German unit (Japanische Industrie-, 1992; see 
Yoshihara, 1989, p. 27). The low incidence of German executives may be attributable in part to 
the comparatively late arrival of most of the Japanese companies in Germany. Several Japanese 
informants commented that the number of Germans in high-level positions would grow over 
time. 
 The problem of a “glass ceiling” on the upward mobility of Germans in the Japanese-
owned firm was cited, not just by middle managers, but also by German workers. The morale of 
German middle managers was low, they said, because promotion chances were so limited. For 
this reason, a number of such managers were seeking jobs elsewhere. The problems of morale 
and turnover among the German middle managers were sufficiently severe that some works 
council members said that they would rather have Japanese middle managers. 
 
Conflicting decision-making styles. Though the stereotypes of German decision making as top-
down, “command and control” and that of the Japanese as bottom-up, consensus-based are not 
wholly apt, some differences along these lines occur (Kieser, 1990; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 
1990). Moreover, they caused some tensions within the firms we studied in Dusseldorf. 
 German complaints about Japanese decision making have a familiar ring 
to observers of Japanese companies abroad: “We can’t get a straight answer from the Japanese”; 
“the Japanese often give us vague responses that could mean ‘yes’ or ‘no’ ”; “it takes much too 
long to get a reply to any questions put to the Japanese”; “we are often told that we must wait on 
the Tokyo office for an answer”; and “the Japanese are seldom around to answer our questions.” 
 The Japanese taste for lengthy face-to-face discussion and painstaking consensus-
building figures centrally here. Such practices not only have the sometimes intended, sometimes 
inadvertent effect of excluding outsiders, they take time, so that the German staff wait in limbo 
for decisions to be made and goals set by their Japanese superiors. Learning the not-so- German 
virtue (as one German manager characterized it) of patience was deemed absolutely imperative 
for success in a Japanese-owned company. Not only did it take longer to make decisions within 
the subsidiary, but the need to check with the parent company on many matters of substance 
caused further delay. 
 To hard-driving Western managers, the failure to make quick decisions bespeaks 
weakness or hesitation-ergo a failure of leadership. Moreover, because of tight coupling to the 
parent firm, the Japanese tendency to build slowly toward consensus is accentuated in the 
overseas subsidiary. To a far greater degree than is typical of the regional division of a Western 
multinational, managers of the foreign branch of a Japanese company are constrained by close 
corporate scrutiny and central headquarters controls. 
 Yet the German managers we interviewed acknowledged as well the upside of slow and 
incremental Japanese decision making: once a decision was finally in place, it was executed with 
speed and precision. The German (or American or British) manager who delegated the sole 
authority to make a top-down decision without much input from others thereafter faces the 
problem of getting colleagues and subordinates on board and informed-no easy task with some 
people dragging their feet in irritation at how the decision was made in the first place. 
 Such contrasts in decison-making style most likely lead to serious tension and conflict in 
the relatively uncommon circumstance of an archetypal Japanese manager finding himself 
working closely with an equally archetypal German. The small and new subsidiary of a large, 
conservative Japanese company was such a case. The Japanese manager was nearing the 
mandatory retirement age for this company. Most of his career had been spent in Japan. He was a 
quiet, pleasant fellow, given to the usual Japanese graces of humility and politeness. His English 
was awkward and hesitant. Half the office staff was Japanese; the remainder was German. With 
a sigh, he confided that a recent local hire-a fifty-year old German sales manager-was the bane of 
his life. He described this fellow as impatient, aggressive, and a loner; he was bent on controlling 
his turf and doing things his way. The German manager refused to nemawashi (networkkonsult) 
with colleagues and ignored appeals that he lay out his ideas for others’ scrutiny and input. 
Because of the disruptive and confrontational style of the German colleague, the Japanese 
general manager dreaded the monthly meetings of the management staff and spoke wistfully of 
his impending retirement. 
German specialism vs. Japanese generalism. As a prodigious literature testifies, Japanese 
companies, though tightly structured in their own way, lack many stock features of Western 
formal organization (see, e.g., Clark, 1979; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Employees are hired 
as generalists, not specialists,ll and the jobs through which they migrate have shifting boundaries  
11. Apart from the broad distinction between technical and administrative staff, new recruits typically 
accept a job offer having little information on how the company will utilize their services. 
 
and sparse descriptions. Aside from the precise control of manufacturing tasks typical of the 
Japanese shop floor, rules and procedures, while numerous, are characteristically vague, 
exhortatory, and stress the virtues of compliance over the penalties for violation (Dore, 1973). 
The formal human resource systems that do prevail in the Japanese firm-and there are elaborate 
systems governing personnel appraisal, compensation, and advancement (Endo, 1994)-do not 
travel well. One reason is the reluctance of Japanese managers to conduct direct appraisals of 
foreign employees, denying the local staff clear signals of the company’s expectations for 
performance and reward (Pucik, Hanada, and Fifield, 1989). Language and cultural barriers to 
easy communication plus a high potential for tension and conflict render such appraisals 
unappealing to the average expatriate Japanese manager. Moreover, Japanese-style appraisal is 
not used on foreign employees in part because its fixation with commitment, diligence, and skill 
formation better assesses long-term potential than recent performance (Endo, 1994). Owing to 
higher turnover rates than in Japan, the Japanese company abroad tends not to view local hires as 
permanent members (Lifson and Takagi, 1981). 
 German employees not only share this Western proclivity to define responsibilities and 
commitment to the firm in terms of specialized, circumscribed roles; as Japanese managers see it 
they take it to extremes. The problem was particularly conspicuous among the technical staff and 
skilled tradesmen. The strong German artisan tradition was perceived in quite mixed terms by 
North Rhine Japanese managers. On the one hand, their companies prized German labor skills 
and technical efficiency. Yet they also reported frustration with the intransigence of German 
craftsmen and technicians in refusing duties not encompassed by their job description or formal 
competency. The Germans’ stubbornness in doing things their way and “leave-it-to-the-experts” 
snobbery drew much negative comment. 
 
 Status hierarchies. One of the distinctive formal structures of the Japanese 
firm is the standard ranking system that precisely situates employees in a vertical status hierarchy 
(Clark, 1979; Dore, 1973; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Whether the organizational unit is a 
firm, government bureau, or educational institution, the titles stay remarkably the same (e.g., 
bucho: department head; jicho: assistant department head; kacho: section head; kakaricho: 
assistant section head, etc.). Like military or civil service ranks, they pinpoint status with 
extreme precision but only loosely tap role or function, and inside and outside the workplace are 
used in preference to personal names as terms of address. The familiar Japanese ritual of 
exchanging meishi (business cards) at the outset of a meeting serves to fix the ranks of the 
parties, reducing uncertainty as to the appropriate level of politeness or degree of deference. 
 Germans, too, have a fondness for titles, but German ranks are fewer, are less well 
defined, and (as in the U.S.) vary capriciously from one organization to the next (Maurice, Sorge, 
and Warner, 1980). A frustrated Japanese manager remarked, “In Germany you can’t tell who is 
in charge, or who is senior in rank and has responsibility. You spend a lot of time with a 
particular person only to find your time has been wasted because this person has no authority to 
do anything.” Another Japanese executive complained that “the Germans need more titles below 
the top: you can’t tell their positions from their business cards!” One Japanese manager did 
allow, however, that the relative absence of detailed and consistent rankings in German 
management culture might promote a sense of responsibility and willingness to take initiative. 
 While a Japanese manager’s rank communicates his status and assures him the automatic 
deference of lower-standing colleagues, the tangible perquisites of management standing-high 
pay, private offices, stock options-are less extravagant in the Japanese firm, a fact not eluding the 
German managers we surveyed. The German head of personnel in the subsidiary of a major 
Japanese trading company did not seem to mind that he enjoyed fewer such perks than he surely 
would have at a comparable German firm. The trade-off, owing to the centrality and power of the 
personnel function within the Japanese firm (enhanced in his case by the need to deal effectively 
with German workers and work rules), was that his clout and standing within the organization 
were greater.12 He was the only German on the company’s board of directors and the only one 
reporting directly to the president. 
 The personnel manager in a Japanese company typically enjoys more responsibility and 
status than does his counterpart in an American firm. Not only does the personnel office 
command direct authority over recruitment, promotion, compensation, training, and other 
activities mostly under the control of U.S. line management, but the premium Japanese corporate 
culture places on providing jobs and caring for employees also elevates the status of the 
personnel department and its management. Yet the Japanese human resource function is spared 
many of the burdens that daily occupy the German personnel manager. One German holding this 
position in a Japanese corporation observed that, unlike Japan, in Germany continuous and 
complex employee negotiations were mandatory on almost every issue. Because of Germany’s 
strong unions and elaborate codetermination laws, German workers have more workplace rights 
and power than do workers in other industrial countries. 
 A problem that Japanese companies in North America and the United Kingdom routinely 
cite in their dealings with local management hires is the high mobility and low corporate loyalty 
typical of managerial careers in these countries. Due in part to a fluid market for their services,  
 
12. Largely because of the responsibilities and authority the codetermination laws confer on German 
personnel managers, their status and power within the corporation are generally greater than for their 
American counterparts (who typically rank last among management functions), but still relatively low 
(see, e.g., Streeck, 1984). 
Anglo- American managers stay on the move, switching jobs and companies at short notice to 
advance their careers. The long-term ties and confidence demanded by full participation in a 
Japanese corporation are difficult to achieve with these people, and, indeed, Japanese managers 
commonly justify on these grounds their reluctance to shift control and responsibility to them. 
 In this respect, our Japanese informants saw the Germans as closer to themselves and 
easier to deal with as they were far less prone to change employers than the British or 
Americans. As reported by the Financial Times, a recent study by Alfred Kieser of the 
University of Mannheim and Rosemary Stewart of Oxford University found that “of the 30 
British middle managers in the study, 13 had held their current job for less than two years 
(compared with only three in Germany), and another 12 (seven in Germany) for less than four” 
(Lorenz, 1994a). Yet while the Japanese are well known for loyalty to one company, within the 
organization they are in perpetual motion: changing jobs, departments, and locations as the 
company requires. This practice builds cross-functional skills and cooperation, facilitating the 
flexible allocation of labor that a permanent employment system demands. The Germans are 
likewise less mobile across employers than Americans or British, but, consistent with the 
principle of devotion to a specialized craft or competency, they stay put in one function. Kieser 
and Templeton report that 
“many of the Britons had also moved between unrelated departments or 
functional areas. In contrast, all but one of the Germans had stayed in the 
same functional area. Twenty of them had occupied their current positions 
for five years or more compared with only five of the Britons.” 
(Lorenz, 1994a) 
 
 Oversocialization in a Japanese business culture. A safe generalization regarding 
Japanese overseas subsidiaries is that the longer in place, the greater the independence from the 
parent and the greater the influence of the local staff (Cole and Deskins, 1988; Lincoln, Olson, 
and Hanada, 1978). A well-managed foreign subsidiary is a hybrid: it melds disparate business 
cultures and organizational styles into a seamless whole. Yet for Japanese companies with the 
longest tenures abroad, a curious phenomenon occurs (Lifson and Takagi, 1981). Through 
selection and socialization, the company assembles a core of veteran local employees who make 
their peace with a traditional Japanese management regime and resign themselves to relatively 
unchallenging roles within it. With a shift in corporate policy to some decoupling of the foreign 
branch, more reliance on locals, and an aggressive, entrepreneurial culture, this old guard puts up 
resistance. 
 Moreover, with the addition of younger cohorts of aggressive, ambitious local hires 
unsteeped in the traditional culture, problems of inequity arise. The company wants to reward the 
newcomers at a level appropriate to their skill and drive, but it fears the morale problems of a 
two-tiered reward structure. This pattern seems particularly a problem for the Japanese Trading 
Companies (sogo shosha), which typically have conservative Japanese business cultures and 
long histories abroad but whose Japan-based trade is fast diminishing. They are under pressure to 
position themselves as flexible purveyors of a wide spectrum of business services. Moreover, the 
parent in Japan is remaking itself as a more agile and global competitor, a shift best represented 
by the appointment of the highly westernized and cosmopolitan Minoru “Ben” Makihara to the 
Presidency of Mitsubishi Corporation, the trading company and flagship corporation of the 
Mitsubishi group. These changes in corporate strategy and culture have meant more 
responsibility and greater opportunity for a new breed of local manager, but at the same time 
resistance from and tension with the local old-timers who, as one German manager put it, are 
schooled in outmoded Japanese ways: slow and plodding with automatic careers, risk-averse, and 
incapable of clear and quick decisions. 
 
 German managers as mediators. Much of the role played by high-level local managers 
in Japanese-owned companies is one of interfacing between the Japanese management team and 
lower-level local hires. Several German managers who felt they were coping with this juggling 
act cited their role in devising formal management systems that would simultaneously satisfy the 
German need for structure yet accommodate the Japanese demand for flexibility. The electronics 
firm marketing manager was instituting a Management by Objectives (MBO) program for 
personnel appraisal, which he viewed as less rigid and detailed than one he had known at a 
comparable U.S. company but was nonetheless a quantum leap in formalization over the 
subsidiary’s prior management practice. The trading company personnel manager was in the 
process of installing a Hay Associates system of job analysis and evaluation. The Japanese had 
been reluctant to impose this much structure on the organization but after a good deal of 
lobbying he had won their mandate to proceed. 
 Yet despite their efforts to install some German-style structure within the amorphous 
management culture of the Japanese firm, the German managers acknowledged the merits of the 
Japanese approach. One put it thus: “A German worker can do anything provided he has a 
checklist. The Japanese say they can do anything without the book. The advantage of the 
Japanese approach is that, if a problem comes up that is not in the book, the Japanese will try to 
do something.” 
 
 Mentoring ties us a bridging device. If the local staff are numerous and have long tenure 
in the Japanese transplant firm, they are more likely to be patient with, adjust to, and learn from 
the Japanese. Pucik, Hanada, and Fifield’s (1989) survey of American managers in the U.S. 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms found that the most effective route to influence and inclusion in 
the ruling circle of a Japanese subsidiary was through a mentoring partnership with a Japanese 
manager. This recalls sempai-kohai relations in Japan where a senior employee paternalistically 
takes a younger person under his wing (on-giri kankei) and schools him in the ways of the 
company. 
 Several German executives in North Rhine companies had made such mentoring ties the 
vehicle for their ascent in the organization. The German general manager of the German division 
of a large Japanese shipping company described his successful partnership with the two senior 
Japanese managers as a “triumvirate.” He had been to Japan, studied Japanese management, and 
had adopted that diffuse and interactive style as his own. Germans, he and others noted, were 
accustomed to direct orders and fixed procedures. He had come to respect what he saw as the 
Japanese approach of setting targets and encouraging people to find their own paths to achieving 
them. In addition, he had learned the Japanese virtue of patience and had matched his Japanese 
colleagues in working late, drinking hard, and otherwise demonstrating himself a dedicated 
manager in the conventional Japanese sense. 
 Still, this manager confided doubts that he would ever penetrate the highest precincts of 
his company, though should he stay long enough he thought he might make it to the second 
level. He was fortunate, he felt, in that the Japanese parent firm, while practicing like other 
Japanese multinationals a good deal of “management by fax machine,” was superior to most in 
the autonomy it gave the German branch, so that his efforts to cultivate ties and gain respect 
were paying off in real influence. 
 Another case of partnership was the relation between the German head of marketing and 
the Japanese general manager at the Dusseldorf headquarters of a large Japanese electronics 
concern. Again the German manager (who had spent ten years in the U.S.) had made a successful 
transition to a Japanese management style. Much of his influence and that of other Germans in 
this office, however, he owed to his Japanese partner who, in contrast to the previous general 
manager (under whose regime decision making was almost exclusively the province of the 
Japanese), was an urbane, articulate (in English), and assertive leader committed to shifting 
responsibility to local people. He nonetheless acknowledged that on most questions of substance 
he still sought permission from Tokyo. 
 
Labor, Unions, and Codetermination 
 Working hours. While the average Japanese employee puts in 2,150 hours per year, and 
Americans work around 1,950 hours, the typical German takes it comparatively easy at 1,600 
hours a year. Moreover, in contrast with the much-marveled-at Japanese tendency to give up 
vacation time for the sake of the firm, Germans take their paid holidays for granted, and by 
American standards they are numerous indeed. Some absenteeism owing to “illness” on Fridays, 
Mondays, and around holidays was also noted by our Japanese informants. Low working hours 
do not, on the other hand, convert into lower annual pay: in 1990, 88 percent of the German GNP 
went to workers, as opposed to 80 percent in the United States and 69 percent in Japan. 
 With high German wages and complex work rules, Japanese companies view German 
working hours as a significant cost to investment in Germany, and it is a factor in the limited 
